Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
丽水市区撤村建（并）居实施办法
浙江省丽水市人民政府
丽水市区撤村建（并）居实施办法
丽政令〔2005〕38号
《丽水市区撤村建（并）居实施办法》已经市政府第53次常务会议审议通过，现予发布，自2005年9月1日起施行。
二○○五年八月一日
丽水市区撤村建(并)居实施办法
第一条 为加快推进城市化进程和浙西南中心城市建设步伐，进一步提高城市管理和公共服务水平，切实维护人民群众合法权益，促进城乡经济社会协调稳定和可持续发展，根据《中华人民共和国民法通则》《中华人民共和国土地管理法》《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》《中华人民共和国居民委员会组织法》和浙江省人民政府《关于加快推进浙江城市化若干政策的通知》等有关法律、法规及政策，结合市区实际，制定本办法。
第二条 实施撤村建（并）居的村原则上应具备以下条件：
（一）属市区建成区内的“城中村”；
（二）人均耕地在0.2亩以下的行政村。
第三条 撤村建(并)居可在下列两种方式中选择一种实施：
（一）先撤村建（并）居，将农村村民身份转换为城市居民身份，再由农村合作经济组织按有关规定进行集体资产处置；
（二）先按有关规定处置村集体资产，再将农村村民身份转换为城市居民身份，实施撤村建（并）居。
第四条 撤销村编制，成立社区居委会按以下程序审批：
（一）街道办事处拟定撤村建（并）居方案；
（二）村民委员会依据《中华人民共和国村民委员会组织法》第八条规定，经村民会议讨论通过后，向街道办事处提交撤村建居报告；
（三）街道办事处提出撤村建居申请，报莲都区人民政府批准；
（四）社区居委会的设立、规模调整，依照《中华人民共和国居民委员会组织法》第六条规定，由莲都区人民政府决定。
1．对居住集中符合建立社区居委会条件的“城中村”,可单独设立社区居委会；
2．对居住分散的“城中村”，其农村村民就近并入现居住地的社区居委会。
（五）社区居委会的命名，依照《丽水市地名管理办法》（市政府令13号）规定，由街道办事处提出命名意见，报民政主管部门审批。
第五条 市民政行政主管部门是撤村建（并）居行政主管部门，依法履行撤村建（并）居的指导和管理工作；
市国土行政主管部门依照有关法律法规和政策规定，负责土地资产、违法用地处理和有关土地使用权登记发证等工作；
市建设（规划）行政主管部门依照有关法律法规和政策规定，负责规划和基础设施管理以及房产等产权登记发证等工作；
市城市管理行政执法主管部门依照有关法律法规和规章的规定，负责违法建筑以及其他违法行为的处理工作；
市人劳社保、计划生育、公安、农业农村、经济开发区、电力、教育、卫生、审计、监察等部门，依照各自职责，积极配合和做好撤村建（并）居相关工作；
莲都区人民政府和所辖街道办事处，依照市政府的统一政策和工作部署，负责撤村建（并）居的具体实施工作。
第六条 撤村建(并)居时，对剩余的村集体农用地（不含林地）、未利用地，应当一次性依法征收为国有并按下列规定实施：
（一）依据《丽水市区撤村建（并）居集体所有土地处置暂行规定》（丽政发〔2003〕92号）的有关规定，按照征收集体土地补偿安置标准和 征收程序，由市国土行政主管部门与村集体经济组织签订《撤销村建制征收集体土地补偿安置协议》等相关手续；
（二）登记造册，由市土地储备中心管理。
第七条 村集体资产原则上按照以下程序处置：
（一）清产核资。按照有关规定全面清查核实各种资产、负债和所有者权益，界定权属，明确产权关系；
（二）界定股东资格。统计村实际在册人员，并经村民代表会议确认后公布。股东资格应按照“依据法律、尊重历史、实事求是”的原则进行 界定，并经村民代表会议讨论确定，张榜公布；
（三）设置股权。按照清产核资确认的净资产，由村民代表会议讨论通过；
（四）村集体资产的处置方式和集体资金的分配方案，经所在街道办事处审核后，由村民委员会依法提请村民代表会议讨论通过。
第八条 村集体资产的处置可选择以下方式进行：
（一）组建股份合作经济组织，将股份量化到农村村民个人；
（二）按照拍卖程序组织对集体资产进行公开拍卖，将村集体资产变现。
第九条 村集体资金分配给农村村民个人的应优先用于基本生活保障，具体按照《丽水市被征地农民基本生活保障暂行办法》（丽政发 〔2004〕41号）和《莲都区被征地农民基本生活保障实施办法》（莲政办发〔2004〕100号）的有关规定办理。
第十条 村集体资产处置所涉及土地使用权，按下列规定办理：
（一）经依法批准的村集体房产按《丽水市区撤村建居集体所有土地处置暂行规定》（丽政发〔2003〕92号）办理国有土地使用权登记。土地使用权类型可申请设定为划拨或出让。
1．土地使用权类型设定为划拨的，在《国有土地使用权证》上注明“撤村建居”；
2．土地使用权类型设定为出让的，在办理土地使用权出让手续时缴纳土地出让金，实行边缴边奖，奖励按《丽水市区撤村建居集体所有土地处置暂行规定》（丽政发〔2003〕92号）的最高标准执行。
（二）村集体二、三产业和公建项目留地的处置。根据项目用地批准时间，分别按照《丽水市城市规划区内农民新村和村集体二、三产业及公建项目用地管理暂行规定》（丽政发〔2001〕143号）和《丽水市城市规划区村集体留地及其项目管理暂行办法》（丽政发〔2004〕48号）的有关规定执行。
第十一条 经依法批准建造的农村村民个人住房所涉及的土地使用权，在撤村建（并）居决议（决定）通过后，按照《丽水市区撤村建居集体 所有土地处置暂行规定》（丽政发〔2003〕92号）办理国有土地使用权登记。土地使用权类型可申请设定为划拨或出让：
（一）土地使用权类型设定为划拨的，在《国有土地使用权证》上注明“撤村建居”；
（二）土地使用权类型设定为出让的，在办理土地使用权出让手续时缴纳土地出让金，并实行边缴边奖。人均建筑面积在60平方米（含本数） 以内的，奖励标准按应缴土地出让金（申请时评估确认价的40%）的70％执行（即实际缴纳的费用为申请时评估确认价的12%）；人均建筑面积在60平方米以外部分，按照申请时评估确认价的40％缴纳土地出让金。人口计算标准按照《丽水市城市规划区内农村村民建房审批管理暂行办法》（丽政发〔2005〕14号）第十二条规定执行；
（三）农村村民个人住房土地评估确认价结合区位、环境等因素，按同一地段同一标准执行，不以农村村民个人住房为单位逐一评估。
第十二条 撤村建（并）居村的违法建筑和违法用地的处置按下列规定执行：
（一）违法建筑和违法用地行为，按照《丽水市人民政府关于查处违法建筑和违法用地行为的实施意见》（丽政发〔2003〕58号）进行处理；
（二）违法建筑和违法用地经依法处罚后并准予补办审批手续的，可以按照《丽水市区撤村建居集体所有土地处置暂行规定》（丽政发〔2003〕92号）办理国有土地使用权登记，土地使用权类型可申请设定为划拨或出让。
土地使用权类型申请设定为出让的：2000年7月18日前的，住房类按照申请时评估确认价40％缴纳出让金，办公类按照申请时评估确认价50％缴纳出让金，商业类按照申请时评估确认价60％缴纳出让金；2000年7月19日后的，按照申请时评估确认价100％缴纳出让金。
第十三条 撤村建（并）居村的农村村民住房困难户和无房户，按照《丽水市城市规划区内农村村民建房审批管理暂行办法》（丽政发〔2005〕14号）的有关规定解决其住房困难问题。
第十四条 撤村建（并）居后，由市、区有关部门按有关规定和程序办理该村村民就地农转非手续，并享受市区城镇居民待遇，同时履行市区居民相应义务。
撤村建（并）居转为城市居民的，自农转非之日（政府批准为标准日）起5年内继续享受农村村民生育政策。撤村建（并）居后，凡是参加城 镇职工基本养老保险的城市居民，可以参加城镇职工基本医疗保险；其他居民仍纳入新型农村合作医疗制度范畴，今后有新规定执行新规定。确需继续享受农村村民其他政策的，由莲都区人民政府提出，报市人民政府批准。
第十五条 实施撤村建(并)居村的原农村道路、环卫、水电等公用设施按城市有关管理规定进行管理。
第十六条 对利用撤村建（并）居之机，利用职权和职务之便，进行贪污、挪用、私分、挥霍、或者故意评估不实、虚报损失、低价变卖、转移财产、有意放弃债权等造成集体资产损失和流失的，由监察、审计等有关部门，依法对有关责任人员进行严肃处理；触犯刑律的，移交司法机关依法处理。
第十七条 莲都区人民政府可以依照本办法规定，研究制定《撤村建（并）居集体资产处理实施办法》《村级集体经济组织实行社区股份合作制改革实施办法》等有关具体实施办法，报市政府备案后施行。
第十八条 丽水经济开发区范围内撤村建（并）居有关行政审批工作，按照程序报莲都区人民政府审批，有关政策依照本办法执行。
第十九条 本实施办法自2005年9月1日起施行。原丽水市区撤村建（并）居有关政策规定与本办法不一致的，执行本办法。
